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In this article, I explain the inadequacy of our current state of knowledge regarding the 
effectiveness of antitrust policy towards mergers.  I then discuss the types of data that one 
must collect in order to be able to perform an analysis of the effectiveness of antitrust 
policy.  There are two types of data one requires in order to perform such an analysis.  
One is data on the relevant market pre and post merger.  The second is data on the 
specific predictions of the government agencies about the market post-merger.  A key 
point of this article is to stress how weak an analysis of only the first type of data is.  The 
frequent call for retrospective studies typically envisions relying on just this type of data, 
but the limitations on the analysis are not well understood.  As I explain below, 
retrospective studies that ask whether prices went up post merger are surprisingly poor 
guides for analyzing merger policy.  It is only when the second type of data is combined 
with the first type that a reliable analysis of antitrust policy can be carried out.  There is a 
need both to collect the necessary data and to analyze it correctly. 
 I.   Introduction - The Need for Measures 
  The antitrust policies of the United States should be reviewed periodically 
to make sure that the policies are promoting not impeding competition.  The 
recent Antitrust Modernization Commission performed just such a function and 
concluded that U.S. antitrust policy was basically sound, though the report makes 
a number of recommendations for improvement.  That report relied largely on the 
qualitative judgment of learned practitioners and scholars.  Although the 
qualitative judgment of such people is important, it is no substitute for 
quantitative studies and measures.  The dearth of such studies and measures 
means that there is no reliable guide for determining whether our antitrust policy 
is too lax in some areas and too stringent in others.  
  I will concentrate my discussion about measures of antitrust policy 
effectiveness on merger policy because there are numerous merger investigations 
each year, and therefore a quantitative study of merger policy is possible, while 
that is not true of non-merger policy where at most a handful of cases are brought 
each year.  I will focus on the mergers that the government chooses to investigate 
(e.g., those that receive a second request for information under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act) and assume that the others raise no competitive concerns.  This is of 
course, a simplification, but not an unreasonable one, especially for an initial 
analysis of the problem.   
  In this article, I explain the inadequacy of our current state of knowledge 
regarding the effectiveness of antitrust policy.  I then discuss the types of data that 
one must collect in order to be able to perform an analysis of the effectiveness of 
antitrust policy.  There are two types of data one requires in order to perform such 
an analysis.  One is data on the relevant market pre and post merger.  The second 
is data on the specific predictions of the government agencies about the market 
post-merger.  A key point of this article is to stress how weak an analysis of only 
the first type of data is.  The frequent call for retrospective studies typically 
envisions relying on just this type of data, but the limitations on the analysis are 
not well understood.  As I explain below, retrospective studies that ask whether 
prices went up post merger are surprisingly poor guides for analyzing merger 
policy.  It is only when the second type of data is combined with the first type that a reliable analysis of antitrust policy can be carried out.  There is a need both to 
collect the necessary data and to analyze it correctly. 
 
II.  Why a Comprehensive Study of Antitrust is Needed 
  Several commentators feel passionately that antitrust is too lax (e.g., New 
York Times) while some claim just the opposite (e.g.,Wall Street Journal), but 
passion is no substitute for evidence.  By evidence I mean numbers or studies 
relying on quantitative data.  Imagine that the Federal Reserve Board was trying 
to control the rate of inflation but did not have access to price statistics.  Instead it 
relied on the opinions of a few non-randomly chosen shoppers about how fast 
they thought prices were rising.  I suspect that the Fed would do a much poorer 
job of controlling inflation than it now does.  Moreover, it is possible that in the 
absence of reliable quantitative information, monetary policy could be heavily 
influenced or could be perceived to be influenced by the ideological views of the 
people running the Federal Reserve Board.   
    There are some data on antitrust but they mainly relate to the frequency of 
enforcement actions, such as the number of cases brought.  Those numbers are 
often analyzed, yet knowing how many cases are brought tells one little about 
whether there are too few or too many cases brought, and whether the right cases 
are being brought. Unfortunately, the problem of figuring out what statistics to 
collect in order to determine whether antitrust policy is working well is a much 
harder problem than that facing the Fed in its price data collection efforts.  We 
suggest below what statistics one should collect, and describe the type of analyses 
one could perform with such data.  Surprisingly, the analysis is anything but 
straightforward.  Simple tests, based on sensible intuition, turn out to be 
misleading, while slightly more refined tests work well. 
    A fundamental question facing enforcement officials is whether their 
current merger policy is too lax or too stringent.  This question is different from 
whether a particular merger enforcement decision was correct.  It is rather asking 
whether overall the government is allowing too many or too few mergers.   
Specifically, is the government analysis of mergers systematically biased?  The 
answer to this question requires one to identify the types of government analyses 
  2that are correct and those that are wrong and the circumstances that lead to the 
most errors.  Because this question deals with overall policy, it can only be 
answered by systematically examining all (or a sample of) mergers.  Determining 
whether in one particular case, the government turned out to be correct or not tells 
one very little about whether overall government policy should be altered.   
Indeed, even if the government policy is set exactly right, it would still be true 
that the government would make random errors in cases.   Although it would be 
desirable to minimize such errors, it is not true that the presence of such errors 
indicates a systematic bias in policy. 
  This last point, though perhaps obvious, often seems to get ignored when 
one hears the frequent calls for retrospective studies of past merger.  Because it is 
an important point, I will highlight it and other key points by labeling them   
“Result”.   
  Result 0.  A retrospective study of an individual merger tells the analyst 
nothing about whether there is a systematic bias in antitrust policy.  At most, the 
analyst can learn whether a particular merger turned out to harm consumers.  But, 
even that observation tells one little about whether the decision to allow the 
merger was a wise one based on the information available at the time of the 
merger.  Even a merger that has a zero predicted price increase will turn out, for 
random reasons, to raise price about half the time. 
    In the next section, I first discuss the types of measures that one might use to 
gauge the effectiveness of merger policy and the accuracy of the merger analysis 
that government agencies use.  I then discuss biases that are likely to arise when 
analyzing such measures.  Failure to use information about whether the mergers are 
challenged causes one to reach incorrect conclusions.  This last point, which has to 
do with what economists call a self-selected sample, seems to have escaped notice 
and causes retrospective merger reviews to be quite imprecise guides to policy.  
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    There are two types of data one needs to evaluate antitrust policy.  The 
first is market data pre and post merger.  The second is the enforcement agency’s 
predictions of the merger.  Any analysis of the data must account for the fact that 
the merger data one examines -- and, to repeat, I only look at mergers that have 
received a “second request” for more information -- already reflects a decision by 
the government agency about whether to challenge the merger.  Virtually all of 
the data on mergers will represent mergers that the Department of Justice has 
decided not to challenge.
1  Therefore, as is now well understood since the work of 
Nobel Laureate James Heckman and others, the analysis based on such a sample 
may yield misleading results unless one explicitly understands the implications of 
how the sample is chosen.  Let me explain. 
  Suppose that a merger is proposed and that if the merger goes through the 
expected price change, ∆P, from the merger is drawn from some underlying 
probability distribution, ceteris paribus.  (For simplicity, normalize the initial 
price to 100 so that ∆P can be thought of as a percentage price change.  If the 
government agency knew this ∆P, then it would allow the merger if ∆P ≤ 0 and 
would challenge the merger if ∆P > 0.  This would be the optimal merger policy.
2  
Of course, the government could be a poor predictor of ∆P and may make a 
systematic error, S, in forming predictions.  If ∆PDOJ  is the DOJ’s prediction of 
∆P, then 
        ∆PDOJ = ∆P + S.      (1) 
 
  I f   S > 0, the DOJ is systematically biased.  It always overpredicts ∆P and 
therefore is too stringent in challenging mergers.  If S < 0, the DOJ is 
                                                 
1 We discuss in the next section how to use data on challenged mergers.  For 
simplicity, I use the DOJ as the government agency responsible for mergers.   
What I say obviously applies also to the FTC. 
 
2 With fixed cost of litigation, one might want to require a positive ∆P, but this is 
a detail for the point being made in the text.  Indeed, the government can 
challenge a merger only if it “substantially” lessens competition.  I am, for 
simplicity, assuming that the DOJ is using a consumer (not total) surplus standard. 
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mergers. 
    Consider the case where S = 0.  The shaded part of Figure 1 indicates 
which mergers the government allows to go through unchallenged.  Since all 
mergers in the shaded part have ΔP ≤ 0, an analysis of unchallenged mergers will 
reveal that on average ∆P is not zero, as some might expect, but negative!   
  Result 1:  If the government is unbiased (S = 0), retrospective studies of 
unchallenged mergers should be expected to indicate that on average post merger 
price falls.   Similarly, if the government is too stringent (S > 0), an analysis of 
unchallenged mergers should be expected to indicate that post-merger prices fall, 
since the only unchallenged mergers are those with negative ΔP less  than -S.   
Therefore, one cannot conclude that merger policy is too stringent merely from 
observing that post-merger prices fall. 
  Result 2:  If the government is too lax (S <0), then it is still quite possible 
that E(∆P)<0 where E(∆P) is the expectation across all unchallenged mergers of 
∆P conditional on a merger being unchallenged . 
 
    The reason for Result 2 is easy to see in Figure 1.  If the boundary 
between “allow” and “challenge” moves away from 0 and to the right (S  < 0)
3, 
then it will still be the case that many unchallenged mergers will have ∆P < 0.  
                                                 
3 If the government is lax (e.g., S = -5), then it will allow a merger where  
∆P =$5.  Hence, the boundary in Figure 1 between “challenge” and “allow” 
moves to the right to ∆P = $5. 
  5Only when S gets sufficiently large negatively will E(∆P) > 0.  We therefore 
have: 
  Result 3:  For a sufficiently biased policy (S < 0) of laxity, E(∆P)>0. 
The consequence of Results 1-3 is that retrospective studies of price change that 
focus on the average price change will not be a very good way of evaluating 
merger policy.  It is correct that if one finds that ∆P is on average positive, then 
we know the government policy is too lax, but this is a very weak test.  The 
reason is that we know from Result 2 that retrospective studies of price change 
can show negative price increases even if the government policy is too lax. 
    A much better test of government bias would be to combine pre and post 
merger price data, ∆P, with the DOJ’s predicted price changes, ∆PDOJ, and then 
explicitly calculate S.  Notice that from the way (1) is set up, the estimate of S as 
the average of ∆PDOJ minus ∆P  over all unchallenged mergers will precisely 
estimate S.   
  We  have: 
Result 4:  The bias S in equation (1) can be estimated as the difference between 
∆PDOJ and ∆P across all unchallenged mergers.   
 
    Notice that from the simple assumptions underlying equation (1), it 
follows that S is estimated correctly for each merger as ∆PDOJ  – ∆P.  The contrast 
between the precision in Result 4 and imprecision in Results 1 or 2 emphasizes 
why combining pre and post merger data with data on the enforcement agency’s 
assessment is necessary to avoid the imprecision of Results 1 or 2.  (In the next 
section, we show that the same type of results survives in a more realistic setting 
in which the bias is regarded as a random variable.)  According to Result 1, one 
cannot conclude that antitrust policy is too stringent merely by observing whether 
price falls post-merger.  According to Result 2, retrospective merger studies may 
fail to detect a lax antitrust policy because retrospective studies may show no 
price increase post merger.  But Result 4 shows that a lax antitrust policy will be 
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on the DOJ predictions at the time of merger.
4
 
IV.  Evaluation of Antitrust Analyses 
    The previous section explained the need to combine pre and post merger 
data with DOJ data on their evaluation of the merger.  The discussion focused for 
simplicity only on price.  But, of course, during the course of an investigation 
there are many types of analyses that are done.  Each of them can be analyzed for 
their accuracy, as I now explain. 
  In  many  merger  investigations,  considerations of entry, product 
repositioning, ability of buyers to vertically integrate, and predictions of price and 
market share from merger simulations are all used to guide the analysis. Yet we 
have few if any studies investigating the validity of any of these types of analysis. 
For example, suppose that in some of the unchallenged mergers, one finds that the 
reason for the government agency not challenging the merger is related to the 
likelihood of entry. We should test whether in fact entry turns out to be an 
important constraining effect on price.  How often does entry occur in cases 
where it is alleged to be easy and therefore a tight constraint on price?  When it 
does not occur, is that because price did not rise?  Do government agencies too 
willingly accept claims that entry can constrain price?  Similarly, in cases where 
the government relies on merger simulation, how well do the price predictions 
and market share predictions turn out?  In cases where the government relies on 
product repositioning, does such repositioning in fact occur after the merger?   
How does the frequency of large buyers’ using vertical integration as a means to 
                                                 
 
4In the absence of data on DOJ predictions, it might still be possible to estimate S.  
If one can observe ΔP  for each unchallenged merger, then one can draw the 
distribution of ΔP.  Under the assumptions in the text, the largest observed value 
of ΔP will equal – S.  To see this, notice in Figure 1 that the line ΔP = -S  is the 
dividing line between the area labeled “challenge” and “allow” when S  ≠ O .  
Because ΔP is an expectation not an actual value, the method just described needs 
to be adjusted slightly.  I discuss this adjustment in Section 4.  Estimating S as 
described in the text is likely to produce more accurate estimates of S since it 
utilizes more data. 
 
  7protect themselves against price increases compare to the frequency of the 
government’s reliance on vertical integration as a constraint on a merger’s ability 
to raise price?  Again, when it does not occur, is that because price did not rise?  
Without such studies, there is no way to judge and improve the analysis 
underlying most merger policy.   
     In order to perform these types of studies, the DOJ at the end of each 
merger investigation should fill out a data sheet that summarizes each of their 
analyses, including price, entry, product and predictions, so that their predictions 
can be compared to actual industry behavior.  Of course, one would have to 
account for how conditions post merger have changed (e.g., cost may have 
exogenously risen, demand conditions may have changed, product quality may 
have changed, etc.) and figure out how that would change the DOJ prediction, but 
that type of adjustment is routinely done in econometric studies.  Such 
adjustments no doubt complicate the analysis, but are essential. 
 
V.  Extension of Results – A More Realistic Model 
  In this section, we show that our major results persist in a more realistic 
and complicated model of bias.  We also discuss how to use a dataset on 
challenged mergers in addition to the dataset on unchallenged mergers. 
   (a)  Allowing Bias to be Random 
    Using the same notation as before, we previously defined S, the systematic 
bias, by the equation 
 
∆PDOJ = ∆P + S.       (1) 
 
  Notice that in eq. (1), ∆PDOJ and ∆P are both expected prices not the 
actual price in the future.  In fact, there will typically be many new events that 
occur between the time of the merger review when the predictions are formed and 
the time when the actual price is observed.  For any particular merger, ceteris 
paribus, the relation between the actual price change, ∆P*, and the predicted is 
 
  ∆P* = ∆P + E,      (2) 
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where E is a random variable with expectation 0, independent of ∆P.  If one can 
observe ∆P* for many mergers, then it follows that an estimate of the average ∆P 
will be given by the average of ∆P* across all mergers since the average of E will, 
in expectation, equal 0.  The upshot is that the addition of E in (2) creates no 
estimation complications and the procedure described in the earlier section where 
we ignored E is a valid one for calculating expected price changes.
5
  Eq. (1) has the unrealistic implication that the DOJ is off by exactly S in 
its expected price prediction in each merger.  A more realistic model would allow 
for any systematic bias to be random across mergers, but to have a common 
average, S.  For example, one can think of the DOJ being systematically biased 
upward in its price predictions on average, but on some mergers it is less so, while 
others it is more so.  For example, one could think of the economist choosing one 
of many modeling techniques and that the randomness arises because the 
modeling techniques vary.  We therefore, rewrite equation (1): 
 ∆PDOJ  = ∆ P + S + η ,    (3) 
where η  is a random error independent of ∆P and S with expectation equal to 0.   
  The consequence of this more realistic set-up is that the simplicity of 
Figure 1 disappears (or is reduced) and a more sophisticated analysis is required.  
The reason the simplicity vanishes is because the set of unchallenged mergers will 
now be more complicated to determine than in Figure 1.  For example, if  S = 0, 
then  under the previous assumptions, as Figure 1 shows, the set of all 
unchallenged mergers are those in the shaded area to the left of the ∆P = 0 line.  
Now, however, it is possible that some merger where ∆P < 0, may be challenged 
if the error η  is sufficiently positive.  The probability that a merger is challenged 
will still be monotonic in ∆P, but it will not be either 0 or 1 as in Figure 1.  
                                                 
5 The addition of a stochastic component, E,  means that the procedure to estimate 
S described in Footnote 4 needs to be modified slightly.  The actual distribution of 
ΔP* for unchallenged mergers is a mixture of the distribution of ΔP (truncated at 
ΔP = -S) and the distribution of E.  Under certain assumptions on the 
distributions, one can estimate the (truncated) distribution of ΔP and then estimate 
S as max -ΔP.   
 
  9Similarly, a very bad merger (∆P very high) has a chance of being unchallenged if 
η  is sufficiently negative.   
  The net effect is that unlike before where 




fΔP  d(ΔP) < 0,                               (4) 
 
 now,   
 








  fΔP = the probability density of ΔP, and 
  λ (ΔP) = probability a merger with actual predicted price increase of ΔP will go 
 unchallenged. 
  Still assuming for illustration purposes that S = 0, it is straightforward to 
calculate λ (ΔP) as the probability that ΔPDOJ ≤ 0 or that  ΔP + η    0 or  ≤ η  ≤  -
ΔP which can be written as 
 





η(η) dη       < 1, 
 
 where  fη(η) is the probability density of η . 
  λ (∆P) is monotonic in ΔP .  By comparing eqs. (4) to (5), we notice that 
negative ∆P’s in eq. (4) no longer receive a weight of 1, but instead the lower 
weight, λ (∆P), and positive ∆P’s no longer receive a weight of 0, but instead the 
positive weight λ (∆P).  This means that having randomness in η  will tend to 
increase any estimate of the post merger price increase.  Indeed, depending on the 
  10distribution ofη , one could observe a post merger price increase even though S = 
0.  In other words, even if there is no systematic bias at all in the DOJ’s 
predictions, retrospective studies could very well show that there are on average 
price increases for unchallenged mergers.  This confirms the results from the 
earlier analysis that retrospective merger studies that focus only on the average of 
∆P are quite weak in their implications for the evaluation of merger policy.  The 
intuitive reason for this last result is that those mergers that are unchallenged will 
tend to be dominated by those where the DOJ was unusually low (negative η ) in 
their price predictions and accordingly allows some mergers with high ∆P to get 
approved.  If there are many such mergers with high ∆P, then the average ∆P over 
unchallenged mergers will be positive. 
  The following simple single numerical example illustrates the point.   
Suppose that S = 0, so that the DOJ is unbiased.  Supposed that ∆P can take on 
one of two values with equal probability, $-5 or $10.  In the absence ofη , the 
DOJ would challenge the merger with ∆P  = 
$10 and leave unchallenged the 
merger with ∆P = 
$-5.  Retrospective studies of unchallenged mergers will show 
that post-merger pricing is $5 below pre-merger levels.  Now suppose that we 
introduce the error η  which takes on one of two values -11 or +$11 with equal 
probability.  There are now two possibilities for each merger outcome.  For the 
merger where ∆P = $-5, the DOJ will predict a price change of either $-16 or 
+$6, so it allows that merger to go through with probability ½.  Similarly for the 
merger with ΔP = $10, the DOJ will predict a price change of either -$1 or $21, 
so again it allows the merger to go unchallenged with probability ½.   Hence, even 
when merger policy is unbiased (S = 0), retrospective studies of unchallenged 
mergers will now find that on average the price increase is ½ (-5) + ½ $10 = $2.5!  
  This example is meant to be illustrative only.  However, it underscores the 
limitations of the inferences that one can draw about merger policy from 
retrospective studies. 
  In the earlier analysis, we showed how a combination of pre and post 
merger data together with data from the DOJ analysis can provide a much better 
guide to assessing merger policy than retrospective studies alone.  Does that 
  11remain true in the more sophisticated model?   The answer is, yes, though with 
some caveats. 
  For any proposed merger,  it follows from (3) that  
 
S = ∆PDOJ  − ∆P‌‌ – η .                    (6) 
 
  For mergers that are not challenged, we know that ∆PDOJ  ≤ 0, or ∆P + S + 
η  ≤ 0, or   
 
η ≤ - (∆P + S).                                                (7) 
 
  This means that for unchallenged mergers the upper tail of η is not 
observed, hence, it will not be true that E(η ) = 0, but instead η  will be skewed 
toward being negative and hence E(η /unchallenged merger) < 0.  Therefore, if 
one estimates S by averaging ∆PDOJ  -  ∆P‌‌ over all unchallenged mergers, it 
follows from (6) and (7) that the estimate, S ,  of S will have the property that 
E(S )<S.   In other words, in the more realistic model of this section, it becomes 
more difficult than before to estimate S even when one combines pre and post 
merger data with data on DOJ predictions.  Because of the self-selected nature of 
the set of unchallenged mergers, the best one can do, without resorting to more 
sophisticated modeling, is to obtain an estimate of a lower bound on S.  If that 
lower bound is positive, then we know that antitrust policy is too stringent 
(S > 0).  If that lower bound estimate, S , is negative, we are unable to say very 
much about whether antitrust policy is too lax (S < 0) or too stringent (S > 0)  
since either is consistent with S <  0.   However, if one is willing to impose some 
additional structure on the distribution function of η (e.g., η  follows a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and  variance  ),
6 then one can estimate S directly, just 
as before. 
                                                 
6  If one is willing to define a distribution onη , one could estimate S by maximum 
likelihood  while simultaneously accounting for the truncation in  η .  Other 
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  Finally, we turn to another selected sample that we have so far ignored – 
namely those mergers that are challenged, go to court, and are allowed to proceed.  
To understand why this is the only other available data set for analysis consider 
Figure 2 which diagrams the major possible outcomes from merger investigations.  
If the DOJ predicts -- perhaps after a “fix” to the terms of the merger -- no price 
increase from the merger, (ΔPDOJ  ≤  0), then the merger is unchallenged and goes 
forward.  This set of mergers provides data (labeled dataset 1 in Figure 2) that we 
have already discussed extensively.  But in addition to unchallenged mergers, 
there are mergers that the DOJ challenges (ΔPDOJ  > 0).  In those, several 
outcomes are possible, as Figure 2 illustrates.  The parties could alter their 
proposed merger so that the new merger is unchallenged and thereby becomes 
part of dataset 1.
7   The parties could abandon the merger, leading to dataset 2 
which contains no information on completed mergers.  Alternatively, the parties 
could go to court, and the court could enjoin the merger.   This set of mergers, 
dataset 3, also contains no information on completed mergers.  The final 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimation techniques also exist.  See, e.g., Greene (2003), Ch. 22 for how 
econometric techniques can be used to handle this problem. 
 
7 The group of unchallenged mergers that have been “fixed” might be an interesting 
one to study separately. 
 
  13possibility is that the court sides with merging parties and allows the merger to go 
through.  This set of mergers -- that we have ignored so far -- comprise dataset 4 
which we now analyze.                                                                                                                             
  The set of mergers in dataset 4 results from unsuccessful court challenges 
is a self-selected sample, like dataset 1.  It represents mergers that have the 
property that ΔPDOJ  > 0.   The analysis of dataset 4 has some similarities to that 
for dataset 1, though there is now the complication of the court’s decision.  In the 
case where the DOJ bias is non-stochastic (i.e., eq. (1)) and under the assumption 
that the court is unbiased, the court will allow a merger to proceed only if ΔP ≤ 0.  
Hence, we return to a similar type of result that we had previously in that the 
expected price change of a completed (challenged) merger pre and post merger 
should be negative.  But this time, this finding is independent of S since the court 
is deciding which mergers go forward.  Again, as before, S can be calculated 
assuming one also has data on the DOJ predictions.  [Even if one does not have 
data on ΔPDOJ, one does observe that the DOJ decided to sue (ΔPDOJ > 0) and one 
also observes that the court has concluded that ΔP < 0.  Even if one does not 
observe ΔPDOJ, one can, with sufficient structure on the model, estimate S in a 
manner similar to that described in Fn 4.]
8
  If we now add the complication that the bias, S + η, is stochastic with η 
being random with mean 0, we obtain from eq. (3) that the challenged mergers that 
comprise dataset 4, have the property that (S + η) will tend to be above average.  
The reason is that for a challenged merger ΔPDOJ > 0 which implies ΔP + (S + η) > 
0, or S + η > -ΔP or that the expectation of η will be positive (i.e., η > - (S + P)), 
since it is truncated at the lower end.  Intuitively, this occurs because the DOJ is 
likely to lose in court when it is overly stringent (S + η is large).  Therefore, if one 
tries to estimate S as S  = average of ΔPDOJ - ΔP, one will obtain an estimate of S 
that is on average too high (S < S ) and so is an upper bound.  If S  is negative, one 
can say that antitrust policy is too lax (S < 0), but cannot reach such definitive 
statements if S > 0 because either a positive or negative S is consistent with a 
                                                 
8  A more complicated model for dataset 1 could analyze the decision of the 
merging parties to settle (fix the case or abandon it) based on what their estimates 
of winning in court are.  This would provide additional information to estimate S. 
  14positiveS .  Just as before, it is possible to put a bit more structure on the problem 
to account for the truncation of η ( See, Footnote 4), and then estimate S. 
  Finally, there may have been so few litigated cases that estimating S may 
suffer from small sample estimation problems. 
 
Although I have discussed analyzing dataset 1 and 4, I note that there are other sub-
samples of the data that one might think of separately analyzing.  I list a few 
suggestions below: 
1.  For dataset 1, isolate those mergers that were fixed in response to DOJ 
concerns.  Do those mergers differ from the others in dataset 1 in terms of 
ex post merger consequences? 
2.  For dataset 1, compare the systematic bias and accuracy of price 
predictions in mergers involving specific types of industries (e.g., those with 
rapid technological change). 
3.  For datasets 2 and 3, what happened to industry concentration after the 
transaction failed? 
4.  The FTC is organized a bit differently than the DOJ.  For mergers 
handled by the FTC, one could define various samples depending on the 
votes of the five FTC Commissioners. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
  Without quantitative measures of the effectiveness of merger policy and of 
the accuracy of the government’s analyses underlying merger policy, judgments 
about the appropriate antitrust policy will be based on qualitative information that 
can be subject to alternative interpretations.  Merger policy can be an important 
force for either promoting or impairing competition.  Merger policy is too 
important a policy to let it be set in the absence of detailed quantitative studies of 
its effects on price and other dimensions of competition.  The government 
agencies should embark on such studies immediately and if they lack the authority 
to either collect the data or study it, they should seek it. 
  Antitrust analysis of individual cases has gotten increasingly sophisticated.  
Evaluation of antitrust policy has not.  There is a need to gather post merger 
  15industry data and a need to gather the predictions of DOJ merger analysis in order 
to evaluate whether U.S. policy and analysis can be improved.  Strong opinions 
are not substitutes for quantitative analysis. 
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